Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Program
In 1988, the Grand Canyon Trust (together with the Western River Guides Association, the National Wildlife Federation, and American Rivers) successfully sued the Western Area Power Association, a federal agency that markets power from Glen Canyon Dam. The lawsuit alleged that dam releases for hydropower generation were degrading the Colorado River through Grand Canyon. Subsequently, the Trust became actively involved in passing the Grand Canyon Protection Act (GCPA).
Following passage of the GCPA in 1992, the Trust became one of the original stakeholders in the newly created Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Program (AMP), a 25-interest-holder collaborative process that advises the Secretary of the Interior to implement actions that improve the Colorado River.
AMP not working…
It’s hard to believe that members of the Adaptive Management Work Group (AMWG) would argue for a compromised Grand Canyon. However, the seven basin states and hydropower interests routinely vote against Grand Canyon and block efforts by the entities who protect it.
The AMWG was established in 1997 to recommend to the Secretary of the Interior how best to protect park resources below Glen Canyon Dam through management actions. At the April 29, 2009, meeting, the Trust forwarded a motion recommending that the Secretary instruct the federal agencies to finally produce several required documents needed by the AMWG to make informed recommendations. Not surprisingly, the seven basin states and the hydropower interests once again voted against Grand Canyon. As a bloc, they prevented a majority recommendation from going to the Secretary.
On the surface, it is hard to understand why stakeholders in the AMWG would oppose these information documents and essentially advocate for violating the law. For example, the Grand Canyon Protection Act (GCPA) requires that an annual report be sent to Congress describing resource conditions and efforts to improve Grand Canyon. This important report has been blocked for several years, keeping Congress and the larger public in the dark about resource declines and the failure of the AMWG.
Another example is the GCPA requirement stipulating that the Secretary must update Glen Canyon Dam operating criteria every 5 years. Incredibly, this has never been done, even once. This review is important because it is intended to ensure that the AMWG actually engages in “adaptive management” — that is, analyzing resource conditions and adaptively managing actions to meet goals — with a broad array of interests, including the Park Service, environmental organizations, the academic and scientific community, recreation interests, and Native American tribes.
For collaboration to work, an overarching objective or mission must be accepted by all participants. Unfortunately, the states and hydropower interests use their numerous seats on the AMWG to maintain the status quo and protect the maximum availability of below-market-value hydropower.
Perhaps the AMWG cannot succeed and should be abolished. Perhaps it can succeed by removing the stakeholders who are unwilling to abide by the AMWG Charter and advise the Secretary on how best to protect Grand Canyon resources. Or perhaps it is possible that procedural changes would be sufficient. Here are three possibilities:
- Right now, a super-majority (two-thirds) is required for a motion to be successful. A logical change would be to a simple majority. This would allow the Secretary to see more Grand Canyon motions from AMWG.
- Currently, the Bureau of Reclamation facilitates AMWG meetings and processes. It would make good sense to put facilitation in the hands of the National Park Service, the federal agency directly responsible for Grand Canyon resources.
- Perhaps the AMWG should abolish motions and votes altogether. Instead, the AMWG could become an advisory committee that forwards to the Secretary all of the various options for how best to protect Grand Canyon.



